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Abstract
We provide a new formulation of the Porter hypothesis that we feel
is in the spirit of the hypothesis. Under this formulation we find that
the Porter hypothesis need not hold universally, and identify conditions
under which it may or may not hold. We first consider the case where
the abatement costs associated with a technology is exogenously given.
In that case stricter government regulation increases the incentive for
adopting the new technology if the old and the new technologies are
relatively environmentally friendly to begin with. We then consider the
case where the abatement costs associated with a technology is endoge-
nously given. We show that the Porter hypothesis is likely to hold if the
new technology is significantly more efficient in production compared to
the old technology, or if both the technologies are relatively efficient in
production. Whereas if both the technologies are relatively inefficient,
then the Porter hypothesis is unlikely to go through. Thus, under the
appropriate conditions, the Porter hypothesis may hold even in a static
framework.
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Re-visiting the Porter Hypothesis
Introduction
The traditional approach to environmental policy consists of com-
paring the beneficial effects of environmental regulation with the cost
that must be borne to secure these benefits. It is out of this benefit-
cost approach that the standard trade-off discussed in virtually every
environmental economics text book emerges.
Porter and van der Linde (1995) deny the validity of this approach,
claiming that it ignores the fact that environmental regulation leads
to greater innovations. Thus in their view there is no trade off, as it
has been observed in many cases that the enforcement of environmental
regulations not only reduce environmental damage, but also lead to cost
efficient product quality. This is the well known Porter Hypothesis.1
The major empirical evidence that Porter and van der Linde (1995)
suggest in support of their claim is a series of case studies. But with lit-
erally hundreds of thousands firms subject to environmental regulations
in United States alone, it would not be hard to find instances where
regulation has seemingly worked to a polluting firm’s disadvantage. It
has thus been argued that collecting cases where this has happened in
no way establishes a general presumption in favor of this outcome.
The Porter hypothesis has also been criticized by Palmer, Oates
and Portney (1995) who argue that there is always a trade-off between
environmental regulation and competitiveness. They use a simple static
model to make the point that if technology was not worth investing in
before, then its benefits will not be enough to fully offset the costs of
compliance after stricter regulations are enforced.
In this paper we analyze this question in a theoretical framework. We
consider a model with a single monopoly firm producing a dirty product.
This firm can either choose an existing technology, or a new technology
which is more efficient in production. We first consider the case where
the abatement costs associated with a technology is exogenously given.
In that case stricter government regulation increases the incentive for
adopting the new technology if the old and the new technologies are
relatively environmentally friendly to begin with.
Given that the case for the Porter hypothesis is based on R&D
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induced by environmental regulations, we then consider a framework
where the production technology is exogenously given, but the emission
technology is endogenously determined through R&D.
We examine a dirty industry where production leads to pollution,
the level of pollution being monotonically related to the level of output.
The government uses several policy measures, e.g. imposing emission
taxes etc., so as to control the pollution. All these policy measures create
an abatement cost for the firms. Clearly the stricter the governmental
policy, the higher is the abatement cost.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide a new
formulation of the Porter hypothesis. For example, this is different
from the formulation adopted by Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995).
We argue, however, that our formulation is consistent with the spirit of
the Porter hypothesis.
We then briefly describe our main results. We show that the incen-
tive to adopt the new technology is increasing with stricter government
regulation if the new technology is significantly more efficient in pro-
duction compared to the old technology, or if both the technologies are
relatively efficient in production (in a sense made formal later in the
paper). In that case there are parameter values for which the Porter
Hypothesis holds. Whereas if both the technologies are relatively in-
efficient (in a sense made formal later), then the Porter hypothesis is
unlikely to go through.
We then briefly relate our paper to the literature. The paper closest
to our own is Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995). In a similar simple
static framework, they argue that the Porter hypothesis cannot hold.
In contrast, we find that under the appropriate framework the Porter
hypothesis may go through. This is because our formulation of the
Porter hypothesis is different from that in Palmer, Oates and Portney
(1995). Other papers that seek to justify the Porter hypothesis adopt a
dynamic framework. Thus one of the main contributions of this paper is
to argue that the Porter hypothesis goes through under a simple static
framework and is thus of wider applicability than is suggested by the
literature.
II. Exogenous Emission technology
The market comprises one monopolist whose demand function is
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given by
q = a− p. (1)
The cost function has three components, production cost, abatement
cost, and cost of R&D. The production cost is given by
ciq. (2)
Note that the subscript denotes the technology, where i = 0 refers to
the existing technology, and i = 1 refers to a new technology. The new
technology is more cost efficient, i.e. c0 > c1. Moreover, adopting the
new technology involves a fixed cost of F .
The abatement cost function is given by
Aeiq, (3)
where ei is the index of emission. Thus the total pollution is eiq.2
The existing technology is captured by the parameters (co,eo). Thus
for the existing technology the production cost function is given by
c0q, and the abatement cost function is given by Ae0q. Another new
cost efficient technology available to the firm is characterized by the
parameters (c1, e1), with the production cost function c1q, and the
abatement cost function Ae1q.
In this section we assume that all the technologies are exogenously
given. In the next section we allow for the case where the technologies
are endogenously chosen through R&D.
We solve for the optimal technology choice of the firm using the
backwards induction logic.
We first consider the case where e1 < eo, c1 < co, i.e. the new
technology is more cost efficient and environment friendly compared to
the existing technology.
Let the monopolist’s profit function under the existing technology
be
pio = q(a− q)− coq −Aeoq. (4)
Therefore the first-order condition of profit maximization is given
by3
dpio
dq
= a− 2q − co −Aeo = 0,
or, a− 2q = Aeo + co. (5)
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Therefore, the equilibrium level of output under the old technology
qeo is given by
qeo =
a− co −Aeo
2
, (6)
and the equilibrium profit level under the existing technology is
pieo = pq
e
o − coqeo −Aeoqeo. (7)
Substituting the value of qe0 we obtain,
pieo =
1
4
(a− co −Aeo)2. (8)
Similarly for the new technology the equilibrium level of output
qe1 =
1
2
(a− c1 −Ae1), (9)
and the equilibrium level of profit
pie1 =
1
4
(a− c1 −Ae1)2. (10)
Let F denote the setup cost of adopting the new technology, includ-
ing any licensing fee required for adopting the new technology.
Therefore the incentive for adopting the new technology
∈= pie1 − F − pi
=
1
4
[a− c1 −Ae1]2 − F − 14 [a− co −Aeo]
2. (11)
Next observe that
∂ ∈
∂A
=
1
4
2[a− c1 −Ae1](−e1)− 14 .2[a− co −Aeo](−eo)
=
eo(a− co −Aeo)
2
− e1(a− c1 −Ae1)
2
. (12)
We then consider the case where e0 = e1 = e, but co 6= c1. Define
f i(e) ==
e(a− ci −Ae)
2
, i = 0, 1. (13)
Note that f i(e) is strictly concave in e with f i(0) = 0 which attains a
maximum at
e∗i =
a− ci
2A
. (14)
Clearly,
∂ ∈
∂A
= f0(e0)− f1(e1). (15)
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We focus on the case where c1 < c0. Then e∗0 < e
∗
1 and f
0(e) < f1(e),
for all e.
First consider the case where e1 is very small (please see figure 1).
We then note that lime1→0 f
1(e1)= 0 and thus lime1→0
∂∈
∂A = f
0(e0) > 0.
Hence from the continuity of f i it follows that if e1 is very small com-
pared to eo, then an increase in government regulation would increase
the incentive for the adoption of the new environment friendly technol-
ogy i.e. ∂∈∂A > 0.
Next consider the case where e1 < e0, but close to e0 (please see
figure 2). Note that lime1→e0
∂∈
∂A= f
0(e0) − f1(e0) < 0, since f0(e) <
f1(e), for all e. Hence from the continuity of f i it follows that if e1
is very close to eo, then an increase in government regulation would
decrease the incentive for the adoption of the new environment friendly
technology i.e. ∂∈∂A < 0.
Summarizing the above discussion we can now write down our next
proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that e1 < e∗1, eo < e
∗
o, and c1 < co, i.e.
the new technology is more cost efficient, as well as more environment
friendly.
(i) If e1 < eo, and e1 is very small compared to eo, in the sense
that e0(a − c0 − Ae0) > e1(a − c1 − Ae1), then an increase in govern-
ment regulation would increase the incentive for the adoption of the new
environment friendly technology.
(ii) If e1 < eo, but significantly close to eo, in the sense that e0(a−
c0 − Ae0) < e1(a − c1 − Ae1), then an increase in government regu-
lation (i.e. A), would decrease the incentive for the adoption of new
environment friendly technology.
Note that Proposition 1(i) can be interpreted as an explanation of
the Porter Hypothesis. The intuition is as follows. With an increase
in A, the abatement cost in the existing technology increases. Since
e1 is very small the abatement cost in the new technology does not
increase at the same rate. Thus the new technology becomes relatively
more attractive. Note that this is the straight forward application of
the replacement effect first identified by Arrow (1962).
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III. Endogenous Emission Technology
In this section we assume that the level of ei is endogenously deter-
mined by R&D. To begin with the two technologies are equally environ-
ment friendly with a common emission parameter of ê. The R&D cost
function is
r(ê− ei)2, (16)
where r is the index of R&D cost.
For any given level of A, we consider the following 2 stage model:
Stage 1: The firm decides on which technology to adopt.
Stage 2 : The firm decides on the level of R&D and production.
We use a standard backwards induction argument to solve the model.
The profit function of the monopolist is given by
pii(qi, ei) = qi(a− qi)− ciqi −Aeiqi − r(ê− ei)2. (17)
Thus the first-order conditions are:4
∂pii(qi, ei)
∂q
= a− 2qi − ci −Aei = 0, (18)
and,
∂pii(qi, ei)
∂ei
= −Aqi + 2r(ê− ei) = 0. (19)
Solving the two first order conditions simultaneously we obtain the
optimal level of output and the emission index:
e∗i =
Aci + 4rê− aA
4r −A2 , (20)
and, q∗i =
2r(aA−A2ê−Aci)
A(4r −A2) . (21)
Let us define the equilibrium profit of the monopolist
Πi(A) = pii(q∗i , e
∗
i ). (22)
We are now in a position to provide a definition of the Porter Hy-
pothesis in our framework.
Definition. The Porter Hypothesis holds for certain parameter val-
ues A,A∗ and F, A∗ > A, if
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(i) Π0 (A) > Π1 (A)− F , and
(ii) Π0 (A∗) < Π1 (A∗)− F .
Thus we say that the Porter Hypothesis holds if, for a low level of
A, the firm chooses the existing technology, whereas for a higher level
of A, the firm chooses the new technology.
Why do we adopt this definition? Let A < A∗. We are interested in
a situation where the welfare under A and the old technology is lower
than that under A∗ and the new technology. Under such a situation the
question is whether the firms can be induced to choose the new tech-
nology through an appropriate choice of A. It is precisely this question
that is addressed by our interpretation, where note that conditions (i)
and (ii) are concerned with the firm’s incentive for adopting the new
technology.
Note that our definition of the Porter hypothesis is different from
that adopted by Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995). Under the Palmer,
Oates and Portney (1995) approach the Porter hypothesis is said to
hold if there exists parameter values A,A∗ and F, A∗ > A, such that
(i) Π0 (A) > Π1 (A) − F and (ii) Π0 (A) < Π1 (A∗) − F . It is easy
to show, mimicing the arguments given in Palmer, Oates and Portney
(1995), that in this sense the Porter hypothesis can never hold.5
We feel that our alternative definition is not inconsistent with the
spirit of Porter and van der Linde’s (1995) argument, and provides a
way forward from the impasse reached through the Palmer, Oates and
Portney (1995) definition.
We then proceed with the analysis. From our earlier analysis we
obtain
e∗1 < e
∗
0.
Thus per unit pollution is lower under the new technology than under
the existing technology.
Next let I(A) denote the incentive for adopting the new technology.
Then the monopoly firm opts for the new technology if and only if
I(A) = Π1(A)− F −Π0(A) > 0. (23)
Next note that
dI(A)
dA
=
d
dA
[Π1(A)− F −Π0(A)] = dΠ1(A)
dA
− dΠ0(A)
dA
=
∂Π1(A)
∂A
− ∂Π0(A)
∂A
= e∗0q
∗
0 − e∗1q∗1 , (24)
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where the above equation follows from the envelope theorem. Thus the
incentive to adopt the new technology is increasing in A if and only if
the equilibrium level of pollution under the existing technology is greater
than that under the new technology.
Next, note that
dI(A)
dA
=
2r
(4r −A2)2 [(Aco+4rê−aA)(a−Aê−co)−(Ac1+4rê−aA)(a−Aê−c1)].
(25)
We then define
∇(c) = (Ac+ 4rê− aA) (a−Aê− c) , (26)
∇0 = ∇(c0) = (Ac0 + 4rê− aA) (a−Aê− c0) , (27)
and, ∇1 = ∇(c1) = (Ac1 + 4rê− aA) (a−Aê− c1) . (28)
Therefore,
sign
dI
dA
= sign [∇0 −∇1]. (29)
Next let
c∗ = argmax
c
∇(c) = 2aA− ê
(
A2 + 4r
)
2A
, (30)
and note that
∂2∇(c)
∂c2
= −2A < 0. (31)
Thus ∇(c) is strictly concave.
We then examine the effect of a change in A on the incentive to
adopt the new technology (please see figure 3).
First, suppose that c1 < c0 < c∗. Then, from the concavity of ∇(c)
and the fact that it achieves its maximum at c∗, it is clear that ∇0 > ∇1.
Thus, dI(A)dA > 0.
Next consider the case where c∗ < c1 < c0. Mimicing the earlier
argument we have that ∇0 < ∇1. Thus, dI(A)dA < 0.
Finally we examine the case where c1 < c∗ < c0. Suppose c0 is not
too large in the sense that there exists c(c0) such that ∇(c(c0)) = ∇(c0).
Then, for all c1 < c(c0), we have that ∇0 > ∇1. Thus dI(A)dA > 0.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our next result.
Proposition 2. (i) Per unit pollution is lower under the new tech-
nology than under the existing one.
(ii) If c1 < co < c∗, then
dI(A)
dA > 0. Thus the incentive to adopt the
new technology is increasing with stricter government regulation. More-
over, the aggregate pollution level is greater under the existing technol-
ogy.
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(iii) Suppose c1 < c∗ < c0 and there exists c(c0) such that ∇(c(c0)) =
∇(c0). Then, for all c1 < c(c0), dIdA > 0. Thus the incentive to adopt the
new technology is increasing with stricter government regulation. More-
over, the aggregate pollution level is greater under the existing technol-
ogy.
(iv) If c∗ < c1 < co, then dIdA < 0. Thus the incentive to adopt the new
technology is decreasing with stricter government regulation. Moreover,
the aggregate pollution level is lower under the existing technology.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the Porter hypothesis is likely to
go through if both the technologies are ‘efficient’ (in the sense that
c0, c1 < c
∗), whereas it is unlikely to go through if the technologies are
‘inefficient’ (in the sense that c0, c1 > c∗).
Finally, it is simple to demonstrate that there exists parameter values
under which the Porter Hypothesis goes through. Suppose that that the
hypothesis of Propositions 2(ii), or 2(iii) hold, so that dI(A)dA > 0. Then
for all A < A∗, Π1(A∗)−Π0(A∗) > Π1(A)−Π0(A). Thus there exists
some F such that Π1(A∗)−Π0(A∗) > F > Π1(A)−Π0(A). Hence
(i) Π0 (A) > Π1 (A)− F, and
(ii) Π0 (A∗) < Π1 (A∗)− F.
Thus the Porter hypothesis holds for these parameter values.
IV. Conclusion
Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that environmental regula-
tions not only reduce environmental damage, but also leads to efficien-
cies in production, or improvements in product quality. This is the
Porter hypothesis. In this paper we provide a new formulation of the
Porter hypothesis that we feel captures the spirit of the hypothesis. Un-
der this formulation we find that the Porter hypothesis need not hold
universally, and identify conditions under which it may or may not hold.
We first consider the case where the abatement costs associated with a
technology is exogenously given. In that case stricter government reg-
ulation increases the incentive for adopting the new technology if the
old and the new technologies are relatively environmentally friendly to
begin with. We then consider the case where the abatement costs as-
sociated with a technology is endogenously given. We show that the
Porter hypothesis is likely to hold if the new technology is significantly
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more efficient in production compared to the old technology, or if both
the technologies are relatively efficient in production. Whereas if both
the technologies are relatively inefficient, then the Porter hypothesis is
unlikely to go through. Thus, under the appropriate conditions, the
Porter hypothesis may hold even in a static framework and is thus of
wider applicability than is suggested by the literature.
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Endnotes
1. Cropper and Oates (1992) and Bockstael and McConnell (1983) also sug-
gest that there is a complementarity between environmental quality and industrial
competitiveness. In some recent follow up work Murthy and Kumar (2001) have
examined panel data of 92 water polluting firms in India. They have shown that the
technical efficiency of firms increases with the intensity of environmental regulation
and water conservation effort.
2. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for comments that helped us clarify
our ideas regarding the interpretation of the linear abatement cost function. The
linear abatement cost can be interpreted as a limiting case of a convex abatement
cost function. In fact, one typical convex cost is where it is linear up to a level, and
then increases abruptly beyond that. We can think of our model as applying to the
linear section, before the increasing part kicks in. Furthermore, the abatement cost
can be interpreted as a tax on emissions. Since, for simplicity, such taxes are often
linear, so will be the abatement cost function. Finally, note that the abatement cost
parameter used here is a linear version of the abatement cost used by Barrett (1994).
3. Note that d
2pi0
dq2
= −2 < 0. Thus the second order condition is satisfied.
4. It is easy to check that the second order condition implies that 4r − A2 > 0.
In what follows we assume that this is satisfied.
5. The argument is simple. Suppose that Π0 (A) > Π1 (A)− F . Since A∗ > A,
from a simple revealed preference argument we have that Π1 (A)−F ≥ Π1 (A∗)−F .
Hence putting the two inequalities together we have that Π0 (A) > Π1 (A∗) − F ,
which violates condition (ii).
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